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This paper presents a method of computing welfare changes (compensating and equivalent 
variations) arising from a tax or social security policy change, in the context of behavioural 
microsimulation modelling where individuals can choose between a limited number of 
discrete hours of work. The method allows fully for the nonlinearity of the budget constraint 
facing each individual, the probabilistic nature of the labour supply model and the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of preference functions. An advantage of welfare 
measures, compared with changes in net incomes, is that they take into account the value of 
leisure and home production.  The method is applied to hypothetical income tax policy 
changes in Australia and comparisons are made at the individual and the aggregate level. At 
the aggregate level a social welfare function is specified in terms of money metric utility. It is 
shown that policy evaluations based on welfare changes can be substantially different from 
those using only individuals' net income changes. 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine the use of welfare measures in the special context of 
labour supply models, where individuals typically face highly nonlinear budget constraints 
and where the appropriate price, the net wage rate, is endogenous as well as labour supply 
itself. Few of the studies which estimate utility or labour supply functions actually produce 
individual measures of the welfare effects of tax reforms. Recent developments in behavioural 
tax microsimulation modelling and its use in policy analyses make the computation of such 
measures possible and provide a strong motivation for developing convenient methods of 
obtaining accurate welfare measures. The advantage of welfare measures over income-based 
measures in behavioural microsimulation is that they can take into account the value to the 
household of leisure and home production time. This is in addition to the changes in 
individuals’ budget constraints resulting from a policy change which induces labour supply 
responses. 
Where welfare changes have been produced in the labour supply context, the approach 
has been to adopt a minor modification of the standard expressions used to obtain welfare 
changes.
1 However, Creedy and Kalb (2005b) showed that this standard approach does not 
allow sufficiently for the usual nonlinearity of the budget constraint facing an individual. A 
method of computing the welfare change, allowing for the full relevant detail of budget 
constraints, was suggested and illustrated.
2 The method can be applied to a wide range of 
utility specifications, independent of whether the expenditure function can be written down 
explicitly. 
The modification to the welfare measure computation required when only a discrete 
number of hours levels are allowed is presented in Section 2. Discrete hours models are used 
in applied work because of the substantial econometric advantages resulting from directly 
estimating the parameters of specified direct utility functions. This avoids problems 
concerning the endogeneity of the net wage in continuous hours models and the need to solve 
the first-order conditions for utility maximisation, or even to know the full budget constraint 
facing each individual. As no explicit labour supply function is needed, a wide range of direct 
                                                 
1 See for example Hausman (1981, p. 672; 1985, pp. 243-245), Blomquist (1983, pp. 187-190), Blundell, Preston 
and Walker  (1994, pp. 4-8), and Creedy (2000, 2001). In the context of commodity demands, including 
situations in which there may be quantity constraints, a general approach was suggested by Neary and Roberts 
(1980), exploiting the Hicksian concept of virtual price; see also Latham (1980) or Johansson (1987). In these 
cases it is usual to define a modified expenditure function conditional on the rationed levels of consumption. 
2 In allowing for the nonlinearity it differs from Apps and Rees (1999) and in its simple and wide applicability it 
differs from Preston and Walker (1999).   3
utility functions can be used.
3 In addition, it is argued that in practice individuals have limited 
choices over the extent to which they can vary their hours. Discrete hours labour supply 
models therefore predominate in behavioural microsimulation modelling. 
The implementation of the approach is described in Section 3, outlining the required 
assumptions. The discussion concentrates on the compensating variation, since no different 
principles are involved in obtaining the equivalent variation. However, both measures of 
welfare change are reported when examining applications. The discussion of the method of 
measuring welfare changes assumes that an individual's utility function is deterministic and is 
known precisely. In practice, the discrete hours approach is probabilistic, in that a random 
term is added to the deterministic component of the utility function, giving rise to a 
probability distribution over the hours alternatives. Furthermore, estimation uses data for 
members of a particular demographic group in which some unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in preferences remains. The use of the relevant utility function’s parameter 
estimates to obtain a household's value for welfare changes in tax microsimulation modelling 
is discussed in Section 3, using the example of a quadratic utility function. The approach is 
used to evaluate two simple policy reforms involving changes in income taxation rates. The 
microsimulation model, MITTS (the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator), is used 
to generate results. Brief details of the model are given in the Appendix. The implications of 
the policy changes are examined in Section 4 and comparisons are made between measures of 
welfare change and net income changes. Brief conclusions are in Section 5. 
2. Measuring Welfare Changes 
This section shows how welfare measures can be obtained in labour supply models. The basic 
framework with continuous hours is described in subsection 2.1, which presents an expression 
for welfare changes and shows how the standard approach gives rise to problems when 
applied in situations with nonlinear budget constraints. Subsection 2.2 presents the method of 
computing welfare changes in the discrete hours framework.  
2.1 The Basic Framework 
Let  h denote the number of hours devoted to labour supply, which may be varied 
                                                 
3 For a general discussion of alternative approaches to labour supply modelling, see Creedy and Duncan (2002). 
In the continuous case, even if estimation is based on an explicit labour supply function (expressed in terms of μ 
and w ), a welfare measure can only be obtained by integrating from the labour supply to the expenditure 
function. This integration may need to be carried out numerically. 
   4
continuously, and let c denote net income. In a static framework, with the price index 
normalised to unity, net income and consumption are equal. The direct utility function is 
written as U(c, h). Leisure is T – h  where T is the total number of hours available for work 
and leisure. The tax and transfer system is characterised by a piecewise-linear budget 
constraint. 
Any optimal position, combining c and h, can be regarded as being generated by a 
virtual linear constraint of the form:  
c = wh + μ          ( 1 )  
For tangency solutions, w and μ represent the net wage rate along the relevant segment of the 
piecewise linear constraint and virtual income respectively. The latter is distinct from actual 
non-wage income and is the non-wage income (the intercept of the extended segment on the 
consumption axis) that would apply if the extended segment were the full constraint. With a 
corner solution, the virtual wage is the slope of the indifference curve at the kink and virtual 
income is the value generated by a linear constraint having a net wage equal to the virtual 
wage. An important characteristic of the optimal position is that the net wage and virtual 
income, as well as the hours worked, are endogenous. 
The evaluation of welfare changes requires an expression for the expenditure function, 
giving the minimum expenditure needed to reach a specified indifference curve at a given net 
wage rate. This can be written in terms of virtual income, using μ(w, U).
4 Suppose there is a 
change in taxes and transfers from system 0 to system 1. Values in each system are indicated 
by 0 and 1 subscripts. The compensating variation is the minimum amount of money 
necessary to return the individual to the same utility level as in system 0 after the change to 
system 1. A tax rate change has both price (of leisure) and (virtual) income effects. The price 
effect is μ(w1, U0) – μ0  while the income effect is μ0 – μ1, so that the standard expression for 
the compensating variation is:  
CV = μ(w1,U0) – μ1           ( 2 )  
where wi is either the virtual or actual net wage rate at the optimum position under policy i, 
Ui is the maximum utility that can be reached under tax system i, and μi = μ(wi, Ui). These 
welfare changes are defined so that they are positive for a loss.
5 This is illustrated in Figure 1, 
                                                 
4 Virtual income, μ(w, U) is obtained by first obtaining the indirect utility function. Substitute c = wh + μ into 
U(c, h), and substitute the solution for optimal h, from 
dc
dh U w =  and c = wh + μ into U. Then invert the indirect 
utility function by solving U for μ. Welfare changes can also be expressed in terms of full income, M, which is 
equal to μ + wT. 
5 The equivalent variation is the maximum amount that can be taken from an individual in order to keep utility 
constant at the new level; that is after the policy change, if the tax change were reversed. It is equal to the   5
where a tax change involves a movement from point A to point B.  
 
















The payment of the compensating variation of μ(w1,U0) – μ1 allows the individual to 
reach indifference curve U0 at point C, while in receipt of net wage w1 and working fewer 
hours than at B. This approach implicitly assumes that the virtual budget line in Figure 1, 
given by the tangent to U1 at point B, with associated virtual income of μ1, does in fact apply 
over the relevant range. That is, the individual can move to the left of B (and therefore 
increase consumption of leisure) along the linear budget line until the hours worked 
correspond to those at point C. The addition of the compensated variation to net income 
allows consumption to increase so that point C can be reached. 
Creedy and Kalb (2005b) showed that nonlinearity of budget constraints can imply 
that the compensating variation, as defined above, is insufficient to restore the individual to 
U0. In addition to nonlinearity, the budget constraint may be convex. A convex range occurs if 
the marginal tax rate falls as hours of work increase. This may happen, for example, when 
entitlement to a means-tested benefit is exhausted. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 where 
again a movement takes place from point A to point B. It is possible, even if B were a 
tangency solution, to have a level of hours, say hc at point D, where the net income is 
associated with an indifference curve, say Uc,1, that is lower than indifference curve U1 but the 
                                                                                                                                                          
negative of the corresponding compensating variation for a change from tax system 1 to system 0, and is 
therefore  EV =  μ0 –  μ(w0, U1).   6
increase in net income required to bring utility up to U0 is a minimum. This is shown in 
Figure 2 by the length DC.
6 Allowing for discrete hours choices only, the individual’s ability 
to return to U0 after a policy change is further restricted. The next subsection discusses the 
computation of welfare measures in a discrete choice framework. 
 














2.2 The Discrete Choice Framework 
Starting from a discrete hours model in which individuals are restricted to a limited number of 
hours levels, h1,…,hH, the utility function and net incomes at each of the specified hours 
points are known. Evaluation of the optimal number of hours is therefore easily carried out by 
calculating utilities at a relatively small number of points, each of which is treated as a corner 
solution.
7 
It is useful to introduce a new notation system, given the use of h1,…,hH to refer to 
fixed  discrete hours levels and the need to consider more than two indifference curves. In 
addition to the subscript denoting the tax system, each indifference curve is given a 
superscript which refers to the hours level; that is 
k
j U  is the utility obtained from combination 
of the discrete hours level hk and the associated consumption determined by tax and transfer 
                                                 
6 The same kind of argument can be applied to the equivalent variation, where it is required to maximise the 
change in income necessary to reach U1 from the budget constraint under tax system 0. 
7 This contrasts with the continuous hours case where an efficient search algorithm, such as the one described in 
Creedy and Duncan (2002), may be adopted.   7
system j. A similar convention is used when referring to virtual incomes and virtual wages. A 
superscript indicates the hours index which defines the utility level, while a second subscript 
refers to the discrete hours level to which the virtual values relate. Hence the virtual wage 
0,
k
j w  is the slope of indifference curve  0
k U  at the discrete hours point hj. Similarly,  0,
k
j μ  is the 
corresponding virtual income, the intercept on the net income axis of the tangent to the 
indifference curve  0
k U  at the discrete hours level hj.  
Consider Figure 3, where it is assumed that there are just four discrete hours levels 
available. The original optimal position in Figure 3 is at point A on indifference curve 
3
0, U  
corresponding to h3 hours of work. A tax reform causes the optimal position to shift to point B 
on indifference curve 
2
1 , U  involving h2 hours of work. Hence the virtual linear budget 
constraints associated with A and B are defined by the pairs (
33
0,3 0,3 ,w μ ) and (
22
1,2 1,2 ,w μ ) 
respectively.
8 Given the limited hours choices available, calculation of the compensating 
variation using the standard approach understates the true amount needed to restore the 
individual to 
3
0 U . The standard compensating variation is the difference between the net 
incomes at points E and B, but it is not clear that this is the minimum compensation needed. 
The possibility must be considered that the individual could work hi ≠ h2 hours and reach 
indifference curve 
3
0 U  with a smaller increase to net income than the distance BE. 
Using the notation described above, 
3
0,2 w  denotes the virtual wage corresponding to 
hours level h2 at point E on 
3
0 U , and 
3
0,2 μ  represents the associated virtual income.
9 To 
determine the compensating variation, the distance between the current budget constraint and 
the net income required to reach the original utility level 
3
0 U  must be determined at all 
possible labour supply points. For example, if net income at h1 in system 1 is at point G 
(which is above the virtual budget constraint associated with B), it is possible that the distance 
between G and F is smaller than that between B and E. Even if G were slightly below the 
virtual budget line through B, it is possible for the compensating variation to be lower than if 
hours were fixed at h2, depending on the distance FH compared with ED. 
 
                                                 
8 For each discrete hours point,  , j h  
0
j c  and 
1
j c  can be determined, after which  ( )
0, j j Uch can be calculated. Then 
0,
i
i w  is the virtual wage in the optimal point  0




ii i i cw h μ =−   
9 Determine net income 
3
0,2 c  necessary to reach 
3
0 U  in  2 h  by solving for c in  ( ) 2 , Uc h =  
3
0 U  and then use 
333
0,2 0,2 0,2 2. cw h μ =−     8
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Point G is the combination of net income on the actual budget constraint under the 
post-reform tax system and the hours level h1, so the indifference curve through this point is 
labelled 
1
1 U  . If the individual is at G, the compensation required to reach 
3
0 U  is the length GF 
and is given by:  
{ } { }
33 11
0,1 0,1 1 1,1 1,1 1 CV w h w h μμ =+ −+         ( 3 )  
or equivalently:  
{ } ()
31 31
0,1 1,1 0,1 1,1 1 CV w w h μμ =−+−         ( 4 )  
The appropriate compensation is the minimum of this type of difference, over all discrete 
hours points. The search for the appropriate hours level, hc, which produces a minimum 
compensation is therefore simpler in the discrete hours context, where all possible hours 
levels are specified a priori, compared with the continuous hours framework, where an 
alternative tangency may apply.  
The procedure outlined above requires only the calculation of the net income 
corresponding to a specified hours level and indifference curve.
10 That is, it is necessary to 
compute net income, c, corresponding to a specified hours level, h, along an indifference 
curve with known utility level U,  where U is computed from a known different combination 
                                                 
10 If a utility function is used for which the labour supply and expenditure functions cannot be derived explicitly, 
it is not possible to obtain an analytical expression for the virtual income  ( )
23
1, 2 0 ,, wU μ   shown in Figure 3. 
However, this does not matter as it is not actually required in the discrete hours context.   9
of consumption and hours. The minimum difference between this net income and the net 
income on the post-reform budget constraint is obtained by comparing all discrete labour 
supply points.  
3 Implementation of the Welfare Measure 
This section examines some practical aspects of the implementation of the above procedure in 
the context of behavioural microsimulation modelling. An important characteristic of the 
discrete hours approach is that it is associated with a probability distribution of hours worked 
in each tax structure for each individual, rather than a single deterministic hours level. It is 
therefore necessary to compute an expected value of the welfare change for each individual, 
and this is discussed in subsection 3.1. The MITTS model’s labour responses are based on 
quadratic direct utility functions, estimated separately for each demographic group. Specific 
issues in relation to this utility function are discussed in subsection 3.2. The problems arising 
when some of the hours levels for some individuals are associated with ranges of the utility 
function where utility actually falls, as consumption (net income) increases, are examined. 
Finally, subsection 3.3 considers the overall evaluation of a policy change using explicit value 
judgements.  
3.1  Computation of Expected Welfare Changes 
In describing the method used to deal with piecewise linear budget constraints, it was 
assumed that the individual's utility function is known precisely. However, in the discrete 
hours approach to specification and estimation, direct utility functions are assumed to consist 
of a deterministic and a random component. The latter implies that each individual has a 
probability distribution over the available hours levels, rather than a single deterministic 
labour supply. Furthermore, estimation is carried out for members of a particular demographic 
group, for whom some unobserved heterogeneity in preferences remains. This is despite the 
fact that parameters can depend on a wide range of observed characteristics of individuals 
which are typically recorded in large cross-sectional surveys.
11 Therefore, to calculate welfare 
changes in practice, it is necessary to decide on an appropriate method of dealing with 
individuals,  based  on  an  estimated   form  of  the   stochastic  term's  distribution.
12   Here  a  
                                                 
11 For a detailed introduction to modelling, estimation and microsimulation methods, see Creedy and Kalb 
(2005a).  
12 Preston and Walker (1999) and Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) used an analytical approach to derive the 
expressions for expected welfare.   10
simulation approach is suggested for calculating expected welfare, based on the ‘calibration’ 
method used in simulating policy reforms. This method is described below. 
If a random draw is taken from the relevant error term distribution for an individual, 
the utility values arising from this draw (the random utility component) combined with the 
deterministic component of the utility function (using point estimates of the utility parameters 
and observed characteristics) can be computed. Comparing the utility values at each labour 
supply point, optimal labour supply can be determined; that is the discrete hours level which 
maximises utility. The main feature of the approach used here is the use of calibration, 
whereby a number of random draws of error terms are obtained and the associated optimal 
labour supplies are determined. Only those error terms resulting in the implied optimal hours 
being equal to the observed labour supply in the pre-reform tax system are retained. When 
applied to a new tax and transfer system giving rise to a new set of net incomes for each hours 
level, each draw produces a single optimal post-reform hours level. Hence, the welfare change 
is computed for each accepted draw, following the procedure outlined in the previous section. 
Pre-reform hours are thus always equal to observed hours but, using the preserved set of error 
terms, a frequency distribution of post-reform hours arises. Consequently a frequency 
distribution of welfare changes can be obtained for each individual. The individual’s expected 
welfare change is then calculated as the arithmetic mean value. This is strictly the mean of a 
conditional distribution. That is, it is subject to the individual being placed at the observed 
hours before the policy change.
13 
In describing the calibration method, it is useful to distinguish between ‘draws’ and 
‘tries’ when selecting from the error distribution. A specified number of ‘tries’ are used to 
obtain an error term which makes the individual’s resulting optimal hours equal to observed 
hours: the successful ‘try’ is then retained and referred to as a ‘draw’. A specified number of 
‘draws’ is retained for computing the expected value of the (conditional) distribution of the 
welfare change. In many cases only a small number of ‘tries’ are actually needed to produce 
each ‘draw’.
 However, for some individuals, it may not be possible to obtain a successful 
‘draw’ within the prescribed number of tries.
 14 In such  a case, labour supply  is considered to 
                                                 
13 The calibration approach is preferred as it uses important information in the sample about each individuals’ 
actual labour supply in a given tax structure. The resulting expected welfare change is also easily interpreted, as 
starting from a single hours level. This contrasts with any approach using simply a set of random values from the 
error distribution, giving a frequency distribution over hours for the pre-reform system, as described for example 
by Small and Rosen (1981). 
14 The number of such unsuccessful draws is quite small in the model described below. Using the method of 
generating conditional draws described in Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (1998) the number of 
unsuccessful draws could be reduced to zero.   11
be unchanged and the compensating variation for that draw is computed by taking the 
difference between net incomes at the observed hours point. 
3.2 Quadratic Utility Functions 
The general procedure described above can be applied in a straightforward manner to the 
quadratic direct utility function. The quadratic utility function has been used in empirical 
analyses of labour supply in the context of discrete hours models; it is used in the MITTS 
model and in the empirical examples in this paper.
15  The quadratic direct utility function 
takes the form:  
22 Uc hc h c h α βγδ ε =+++ +         ( 5 )  
In order to obtain the welfare change measures, it is required to compute net income,  , c  
corresponding to a specified hours level,  , h  along an indifference curve with known utility 
level,  0
i U  (computed from net income and hours at the optimal position). This is obtained as 
the appropriate root of the quadratic:
16  













        ( 7 )  
In practice the appropriate root is obvious. If α < 0 in all cases, it is equal to the 
smaller root, since this places the solution on the section of the utility function which 
increases with net income, c. The other solution is located on the downward sloping section of 
the utility function. The fact that the quadratic utility function can be downward sloping over 
a range of c values may give rise to difficulties when computing welfare measures. That is, in 
some cases there may be no solution to the quadratic corresponding to the optimal utility 
before the policy change,  0
i U . The utility function can become downward sloping before 
reaching  0
i U , in particular for some of the higher discrete hours levels which may require very 
high net income to compensate for the high labour supply levels. Comparisons between net 
incomes on the post-reform budget constraint and the net incomes required to reach the pre-
reform optimal utility  curve  need to be  made at all  levels of labour supply, not simply at the  
                                                 
15 Examples include Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Duncan and Weeks (1997, 1998). 
16 See Creedy (2001) for derivation and further details of the quadratic utility function.   12
observed hours level where the problem is unlikely to arise. This is discussed in the following 
paragraphs, along with other details regarding the practical implementation of the approach.  
The quadratic utility function is not automatically increasing with income across the 
full labour supply range. That is, the quadratic specification implies that there is a turning 
point where the utility function turns from increasing with net income (consumption) to 
decreasing with net income. For all income units, the function is increasing with income at the 
observed labour supply and for virtually all labour supply points the utility function is 
increasing with income under the relevant budget constraint.
17 However, further increases in 
net income are not guaranteed to remain below the income at which the utility function turns 
from increasing to decreasing with income.  
Therefore, in the search for the equivalent and compensating variations using 
quadratic utility functions, a check is made at each labour supply point to ensure that the 
relevant range of the utility function implies increasing utility when net income increases. If 
the condition is violated before the desired utility is reached, the particular point is ignored. 
These points tend to represent the higher levels of hours worked. This could be interpreted as 
an indication that working too many hours may prevent some individuals from reaching 
utility levels above a particular threshold, independent of the income they receive. In those 
cases, the disutility due to limited leisure time may no longer be compensated by more net 
income. 
An indication of the extent to which the above condition is violated is given in Table 
1, using the MITTS model applied to a policy reform involving a five percentage point 
increase in all positive income tax rates. This policy is described and examined in more detail 
in the next section. For single individuals, 11 discrete labour supply points are used and 100 
sets of error terms are drawn to produce the probability distribution of post-reform labour 
supply.
18 This means that for each individual, 1100 equations involving the quadratic utility 
function need to  be solved.  For each couple family, labour supply choices of the two partners 
are simultaneously determined. Couples can choose from 66 hours combinations, made up of 
6 labour supply points for partnered men and 11 points for partnered women; hence 6600 
equations have to be solved for each couple.  
                                                 
17 Only for one income unit was a labour supply point found for which the predicted income was located on the 
downward slope of the utility function. This particular point was treated like the hours points without a solution 
and was thus ignored in the computation of welfare changes. 
18 For each draw, 1000 tries are allowed, although usually much fewer tries are required.   13
The results from running this policy simulation show that there are relatively few 
points where there is no feasible solution. As reported in Table 1, they concern about 1.4 per 
cent of the total number of equations that need to be solved and 21.7 per cent of all income 
units are affected for at least one of their equations.  
 
Table 1 Distribution and frequency of no-solution cases by demographic groups 
Income unit  (IU) type 
Per cent of IU with at least 
one equation without
solution
Per cent of equations 
without solution (for IU 
with at least one equation
without a solution)
Per cent of equations without
solution (for all equations and 
for all IU)
Couples 0.00 0.00 0.00
Single men  5.49 0.15 0.01
Single women  96.21 7.16 6.89
Single parents  16.71 2.59 0.43
All 21.73 6.37 1.38
 
Table 1 shows that there are no no-solution cases for couples, but in 6.89 per cent of 
the equations there is no solution for single females and 96.2 per cent of all single women are 
affected. That is, on average 76 out of the 1100 equations have no solution for single women. 
Table 2 shows that the equations for which no solution can be found occur at labour 
supply points representing at least 20 hours of work per week and are most prevalent at the 45 
and 50 hours points. Ranking single women by the proportion of equations for which no 
solution is found and examining the average characteristics for each decile of no solution 
proportions, the following observations can be made. The highest proportion of no-solution 
equations are found amongst younger women. Unemployed single women and part-time 
workers are also more likely to be affected. 
 
Table 2 Percentage of equations without solution by labour supply point 
 Discrete hours points in hours per week  Single males Single females  Sole parents
0, 5, 10 and 15  0.00  0.00  0.00 
20 0.00  0.00  0.01 
25 0.00  0.01  0.03 
30 0.00  0.09  0.07 
35 0.00  0.72  0.16 
40 0.00  2.58  0.46 
45 0.00  12.46  1.19 
50 0.06  25.78  2.15 
 
The larger occurrence of no-solution points for single women can be explained by 
comparing the parameter estimates in their utility function with those for the other groups.   14
Single women tend to have a much lower preference for income relative to their preference 
for leisure time. This preference for income tends to decrease more steeply with hours of 
work compared to the other groups. The preference for income increases with age and is 
therefore at its lowest level for the youngest group of single women. As a result, it is more 
difficult to compensate single women (particularly if they are young) at higher labour supply 
levels with sufficiently high incomes so they are returned to the original optimal utility. 
The optimal utility level is likely to have been at an observed labour supply level 
which was lower than the relevant labour supply point for which no solution can be found. 
Since the lowest compensation possible is required, these points at which no solution can be 
found due to low preferences for income are not relevant, because they will not result in the 
lowest compensation across all labour supply points. 
3.3 Social Evaluations 
The method described above can be used to obtain the expected welfare change for each 
individual or couple in the database used in a microsimulation model. These can be used to 
obtain excess tax burdens and marginal welfare costs for each income unit. Direct 
comparisons of welfare changes and net income changes can also be made. However, it is 
often desired to evaluate tax reforms in terms of their effects on specified demographic groups 
or for the population as a whole.
19 First, it must be recognised that in many behavioural 
microsimulation models, the labour supply responses of some individuals – such as the 
retired, disabled and students – are not calculated. For such individuals, the welfare change is 
equated to the net income change.  
In addition, population-level evaluations necessarily involve value judgements, so that 
a decision must be made regarding the social evaluation method. Any evaluation for a broad 
group of income units necessarily involves comparisons of units of different size and 
composition. Value judgements concern three aspects: the welfare metric, the definition of the 
unit of analysis and the form of the social welfare function to be used. The latter is closely 
related to value judgements regarding inequality aversion and the implied inequality measure. 
The empirical section reports results based on the use of money metric utility per adult 
equivalent, using the Whiteford equivalence scales reported by Binh and Whiteford (1990), 
and using the individual as the unit of analysis. 
The steps in the social evaluation are as follows. For each income unit, the initial 
                                                 
19 Income unit weights provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics with the Survey of Income and Housing 
Cost data are used in the empirical analysis to obtain aggregate measures at the population level.   15
money metric utility, M0, is obtained, using pre-reform taxes as ‘reference prices’; this is 
equal to full income under the pre-reform system. Given the approach used to calculate EV 
and CV, taking into account the non-linearity and non-convexity of the budget constraint, an 
approach consistent with this approach is used to calculate M0. For each income unit, the net 
income at 80 hours of work by all adult members of the income unit under pre-reform taxes is 
calculated. Assuming that 80 hours is the maximum number of hours that can be worked per 
week, this net income represents full income for the income unit. Then, given the expected 
equivalent variation, EV, resulting from the reform, expected post-reform money metric utility 
is computed as M1 = M0 – EV. For each income unit, the adult equivalent size, s, is obtained 
using a set of equivalence scales, which is used to compute money metric utility per adult 
equivalent,  mji, where j refers to the tax structure and i refers to the income unit. The 
distributions of m0i and m1i can be used to make social evaluations. 
With the individual as the unit of analysis, in computing inequality measures each 
value of mji is weighted by the unadjusted number of persons in the income unit, ni.
20 This 
paper uses Atkinson’s inequality measure, A(ε), where ε is the degree of relative inequality 
aversion. The inequality measure is expressed as 1 minus the ratio of the equally distributed 
equivalent value to the arithmetic mean. The equally distributed equivalent value is the value 
which, if obtained by everyone, gives the same social welfare as the actual distribution. Using 
an additive welfare function based on constant relative aversion, the equally distributed 
equivalent value is in general, for a set of values yi, for i=1,…,n, equal to: 
















⎝⎠ ∑  
In the present context an adjustment must of course be made for the weighting by the 
number of persons in each household. Results can be obtained for a range of inequality 
aversion parameters, ε. Finally, social welfare in each system is obtained using the 
abbreviated welfare function,  ( ) ( ) 1 Wm A ε =− , which is associated with the Atkinson 
inequality measure (and where m  is the arithmetic mean value of m). It is then possible to 
compare results based on money metric utility with those obtained using net incomes in the 
social welfare function. 
 
                                                 
20 In addition, the survey weights mentioned in the previous footnote are used for grossing-up purposes.    16
4 The Approach Applied to Income Tax Increases 
To illustrate the approach outlined in the previous two sections, two hypothetical policy 
changes involving increasing income taxation rates have been designed. The starting point is 
the social security and income tax system which was in place in Australia in January 2001. 
This involved no tax up to AU$6,000, 17 per cent tax between AU$6,001 and AU$20,000, 30 
per cent tax between AU$20,001 and AU$50,000, 42 per cent tax between AU$50,001 and 
AU$60,000, and 47 per cent tax from AU$60,001 onwards. 
In the first policy change, all positive income tax rates are increased by 5 percentage 
points. In the second policy change, all income tax rates (including the tax-free range) are 
increased by 15 percentage points. These policy changes are evaluated using the Melbourne 
Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), which can compute the aggregate and 
individual effects on households in Australia (see the Appendix). Examples of the effect of 
the first policy change on specific income units are provided in subsection 4.1. Overall results 
aggregated to the demographic group level are reported in subsection 4.2 for both policy 
changes. Subsection 4.3 presents results for the first policy change by different subgroups, 
while distinguishing between individuals with positive and zero EV. 
4.1 Individual Results 
First, consider welfare changes for particular income units. Table 3 shows outcomes 
resulting from the first policy change (all positive rates increased by 5 percentage points), for 
one typical income unit from each of the household types representing low, medium and high 
income levels. In each case the higher tax rates imply reductions in expected hours worked 
and net incomes. The increase in tax paid when allowance is made for the labour supply 
response is, as expected, much smaller than if labour supply is fixed.  
The table shows large variations in the marginal welfare cost of taxation, defined as 
the marginal excess burden (in terms of the equivalent variation) per dollar of extra tax paid.
21 
Furthermore the marginal welfare costs are substantial, the efficiency cost per extra dollar in 
many cases exceeding one dollar. For example, the marginal welfare cost for the medium-
income single woman shown is $3.20 per extra $1 of tax raised, and is as high as $5.40 for the 
medium-income single parent shown. This  arises  despite small expected reductions in labour  
                                                 
21 Here, the marginal excess burden is calculated as the equivalent variation from the policy change less the extra 
tax paid. This is not, strictly speaking, the accurate form of the excess burden. This is because the difference 
between the new revenue and the tax which would be paid under the old rates but at the new utility level should 
be used instead of simply the extra tax. However, this would be difficult to calculate since gross income at the 
new utility level would be required.   17
 
Table 3 Examples of Individual Results (in $ per year, except age and hours worked) 
  
Couples Single men Single women  Single parents
LOW INCOME 
Age 60,  50 30 20  40
Net income (pre-reform)         24,893        11,705        11,730         13,227 
Net income (post-reform)         24,064        11,348        11,295         12,687 
Change in net income  -828 -357 -435  -540
Net Government Revenue (Labour supply fixed)  594 335 336 426
Net Government Revenue (including labour response) 150 290 182 128
Hours worked per week  20, 12 25 21  15
Expected hours change in hours per week  -0.80, -0.40 -0.25 -0.40  -0.60
Compensating variation  581 332 332 416
Equivalent variation  581 332 333 416
Marginal Welfare Cost  2.9 0.1 0.8 2.3
Difference between Net Income change and EV (in %) -29.9 -7.0 -23.6 -22.9
MEDIUM INCOME 
Age 35,  35 45 45  25
Net income (pre-reform)         39,457        17,503        16,330         23,685 
Net income (post-reform)         37,427        16,648        15,437         22,916 
Change in net income  -2,031 -855 -893  -769
Net Government Revenue (Labour supply fixed)  1,850 703 630 244
Net Government Revenue (including labour response) 1,626 455 149 37
Hours worked per week  46, 6 40 27  13
Expected hours change in hours per week  -0.40, -0.10 -0.80 -1.00  -1.35
Compensating variation  1,839 690 615 232
Equivalent variation  1,843 691 626 233
Marginal Welfare Cost  0.1 0.5 3.2 5.4
Difference between Net Income change and EV (in %) -9.3 -19.2 -29.9 -69.7
HIGH INCOME 
Age 45,  40 45 40  35
Net income (pre-reform)         85,621        38,669        34,716         61,249 
Net income (post-reform)         76,902        35,490        32,074         55,915 
Change in net income  -8,719 -3,179 -2,642  -5,334
Net Government Revenue (Labour supply fixed)  5,569 2,271 1,970 4,245
Net Government Revenue (including labour response) 3,218 1,490 1,416 2,708
Hours worked per week  46, 40 35 50  45
Expected hours change in hours per week  -1.30, -3.26 -1.15 -1.35  -1.30
Compensating variation  5,346 2,220 1,866 4,159
Equivalent variation  5,483 2,248 1,938 4,246
Marginal Welfare Cost  0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6
Difference between Net Income change and EV (in %) -37.1 -29.3 -26.6 -20.4
 
supply. A further observation is that the differences between net income changes and 
equivalent variations are substantial, and vary considerably among units. The biggest 
difference, of almost 70 per cent, is for the medium-income single parent while the smallest   18
difference is for the low-income single man.
22 
4.2 Aggregate Results 
Table 4 presents the aggregate effects of the policy changes. These are calculated by adding 
all EV, CV and net incomes across all income units without equivalising the amounts. In terms 
of social evaluations, the concentration on aggregates can be regarded as equivalent to the 
assumption of zero relative inequality aversion. The first policy change would reduce 
government expenditure by just under AU$14 billion and the second by just over AU$50 
billion. After allowing for labour supply responses, the savings from the policy changes are 
reduced to just under AU$11 billion and just over AU$40 billion due to a decrease in labour 
supply arising from the income tax increases. In the first policy change, the expenditure on 
single parents after accounting for labour supply changes is higher than it was before the tax 
increase. That is, after accounting for the labour response, the increase in tax revenue was less 
than the increase in family payments and social security payments due to the reduced labour 
supply. 
 








Increase in all positive income tax rates by 5 percentage points      
Net government revenue change (Labour supply fixed)  9,699 2,307 1,338 325  13,669
Net government revenue  change (incl. labour response) 8,013 1,977 1,100 -100  10,991
Average hours change in hours per week   -0.38, -042 -0.30 -0.26  -1.53  -0.41
Compensating variation  9,591 2,283 1,308 304  13,486
Equivalent variation  9,639 2,296 1,333 312  13,579
Marginal welfare cost  0.20 0.16 0.21         - 
a  0.24
Aggregate net income change  -11,417 -2,624 -1,540 -622  -16,203
Difference between net income change and EV (in %)  -15.6 -12.5 -13.4 -49.9 -16.2
Increase in all income tax rates by 15 percentage points      
Net government revenue  change (Labour supply fixed) 34,906 8,638 5,158 1,480  50,182
Net government revenue change (incl. labour response) 34,314 8,538 5,156 1,379  49,386
Average hours change in hours per week   -1.20, -1.44 -0.96 -0.63  -4.15  -1.27
Compensating variation  33,757 8,374 4,847 1,298  48,275
Equivalent variation  34,314 8,538 5,156 1,379  49,386
Marginal welfare cost  0.21 0.16 0.15 8.44 0.22
Aggregate net income change  -39,651 -9,465 -5,556 -2,161  -56,833
Difference between net income change and EV (in %)  -13.5 -9.8 -7.2 -36.2 -13.1
Note a: The net government revenue change (including expenditure on social security) is negative for this group. 
                                                 
22 Not surprisingly, there are some units for which the expected reduction in labour supply is such that there is a 
reduction in tax paid as a result of the tax rate increase. This means that the individual is on the ‘downward 
sloping’ or ‘wrong’ side of the Laffer curve.    19
 
A positive value for the compensating or equivalent variation indicates a welfare loss. 
The equivalent and compensating variations are close in value, since the price of leisure time 
(or the net wage) before and after the reform is similar. With an increase in the tax rate with 
15 percentage points, the difference between the old and the new price increases. Therefore, 
the values for the compensating and equivalent variations, which are expressed in the new and 
old price respectively, become more different.
23 
In relative terms, similar to the specific results in Table 3, the marginal excess burden 
as represented by the marginal welfare cost  is particularly high for single parents due to their 
relatively low incomes, the more generous social security payments available to them, and the 
larger labour responses compared to other groups. In the case of the 5 percentage point 
increase in tax rates, for single parents the marginal welfare cost is affected by the fact that 
there is an expected decrease in tax revenue from the policy change. As a result, no sensible 
marginal welfare cost can be calculated in this case. Single parents are worse off in terms of 
welfare and the government is expected to collect less net revenue (consisting of income tax 
minus income support payments) from this group than before the change. 
The final line of the two segments of Table 4 provides comparisons between average 
welfare measures, in terms of the equivalent variation and average net income measures. The 
change in net income clearly exceeds the welfare change measure. The average gap between 
the two sets of changes is expressed as a percentage of the aggregate net income change. The 
relative differences vary among unit types and policy changes (although the relative 
difference does not appear to be driven by the size of the policy change) and are typically 
large, particularly for single parents. This means that potentially different conclusions could 
be drawn with regard to how the different groups and individuals in the population are 
affected, depending on whether net income changes or welfare changes are considered.  
Summary information regarding social welfare functions is given in Table 5, for each 
of the two policy changes and three values of relative inequality aversion ε. Under all 
specified measures, social welfare and inequality (as measured by the Atkinson’s index) 
decrease as a result of the tax increases, but the use of net income produces much higher 
reductions than the use of money metric utility. This arises because of the failure to value 
leisure time in measures based on net income only.  
                                                 
23 An increase in the tax rate results in lower prices for leisure after the policy change.   20
The magnitude of the reductions in the Atkinson’s index decreases as the relative 
inequality aversion ε increases when the index is based on money metric utility. Conversely, 
the reductions in the Atkinson’s index tend to increase as ε increases when the index is based 
on net income, especially for the second policy change. Different conclusions may thus be 
drawn if the welfare implications of changes in leisure and home production time are ignored. 
To explore differences in implications depending on whether money metric utility or net 
incomes are used in the social welfare function, the results in Table 5 are disaggregated by 
demographic group in Table 6. 
 
Table 5 Social Welfare Function Evaluations 
  Atkinson's index  Social Welfare  
 
Mean 
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.8 ε = 1.4 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.8  ε = 1.4 
Gini
Pre-reform money metric  51,979 0.0151 0.0569 0.0951 51,192 49,021 47,035 0.2080
Pre-reform net income  22,850 0.0282 0.1047 0.1710 22,205 20,459 18,943 0.2913
Increase in all positive income tax rates by 5 percentage points 
Post-reform money metric  50,952 0.0146 0.0548 0.0917 50,210 48,161 46,279 0.2039
%  change  -1.98 -3.85 -3.72 -3.57 -1.92 -1.76 -1.61 -1.97
Post-reform net income  21,617 0.0258 0.0955 0.1561 21,060 19,552 18,243 0.2777
%  change  -5.40 -8.62 -8.73 -8.70 -5.16 -4.43 -3.70 -4.66
Increase in all income tax rates by 15 percentage points 
Post-reform  money  metric  48,263 0.0136 0.0513 0.0863 47,606 45,785 44,099 0.1970
% change  -7.15  -10.08 -9.76 -9.30 -7.01 -6.60  -6.24  -5.30
Post-reform net income  18,545  0.0211 0.0778 0.1270 18,154 17,102  16,189  0.2486
%  change  -18.84 -25.22 -25.64 -25.69 -18.25 -16.41 -14.54 -14.65
Note: Money metric and net income are per adult equivalent. Social Welfare is the equally distributed equivalent level of 
money metric (or net income) in $ per year. 
 
The size of the percentage reductions in the Atkinson’s index based on money metric 
utility is lower for higher relative inequality aversion, for all demographic groups. However, 
when net income is used, the reductions in the Atkinson’s index can either increase (as is the 
case for couples) or decrease (single men and single women) as relative inequality aversion 
increases. Moreover, the ranking of the demographic groups changes with the choice of net 
income or money metric utility. Although inequality reductions are the highest (by a large 
margin) for single parents when using net income, the decreases in inequality are the smallest 
for this specific group when money metric measures are used. Likewise, the ranking of 
couples and single men in terms of inequality changes is reversed if money metric utility is 
used instead of net income.  
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Table 6 Social Welfare Function Evaluations Disaggregated by Demographic Group 
   Atkinson's index  Social Welfare  
  
Mean 
ε = 0.2 ε = 0.8 ε = 1.4 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.8  ε = 1.4 
Gini
Couples                         
Pre-reform money metric  57,046 0.0129 0.0473 0.0771 56,307 54,345 52,647 0.1893
Post-reform money metric  55,861 0.0124 0.0456 0.0744 55,165 53,314 51,706 0.1854
% change  -2.08  -3.85 -3.73 -3.54 -2.03 -1.90  -1.79  -2.04
Pre-reform net income  24,550 0.0270 0.0990 0.1601 23,888 22,119 20,620 0.2838
Post-reform net income  23,145 0.0248 0.0908 0.1466 22,572 21,044 19,752 0.2714
% change  -5.72  -8.10 -8.30 -8.40 -5.51 -4.86  -4.21  -4.38
Single men                         
Pre-reform money metric  45,193 0.0115 0.0448 0.0772 44,671 43,167 41,705 0.1814
Post-reform money metric  44,220 0.0109 0.0426 0.0736 43,738 42,337 40,963 0.1766
% change  -2.15  -5.39 -4.96 -4.56 -2.09 -1.92  -1.78  -2.68
Pre-reform net income  21,640 0.0325 0.1253 0.2104 20,936 18,929 17,087 0.3164
Post-reform net income  20,528 0.0299 0.1152 0.1940 19,915 18,163 16,545 0.3033
% change  -5.14  -8.10 -8.04 -7.78 -4.88 -4.04  -3.17  -4.14
Single women                         
Pre-reform money metric  40,229 0.0110 0.0427 0.0734 39,788 38,512 37,277 0.1811
Post-reform money metric  39,587 0.0104 0.0405 0.0698 39,175 37,984 36,824 0.1759
% change  -1.60  -5.28 -5.13 -4.90 -1.54 -1.37  -1.21  -2.89
Pre-reform net income  18,082 0.0274 0.1049 0.1748 17,586 16,185 14,921 0.2918
Post-reform net income  17,340 0.0248 0.0952 0.1594 16,910 15,690 14,576 0.2771
% change  -4.10  -9.57 -9.29 -8.79 -3.84 -3.06  -2.32  -5.03
Single parents                         
Pre-reform money metric  36,477 0.0167 0.0628 0.1026 35,866 34,186 32,733 0.2277
Post-reform money metric  36,146 0.0163 0.0613 0.1003 35,555 33,929 32,521 0.2249
% change  -0.91  -2.39 -2.35 -2.29 -0.87 -0.75  -0.65  -1.22
Pre-reform net income  17,135 0.0128 0.0480 0.0785 16,916 16,314 15,790 0.1954
Post-reform net income  16,470 0.0107 0.0399 0.0654 16,294 15,812 15,392 0.1765
% change  -3.88  -16.67 -16.76 -16.65 -3.68 -3.07  -2.52  -9.70
Note: Money metric and net income are per adult equivalent. Social Welfare is the equally distributed equivalent level of 
money metric (or net income) 
 
The results in Table 6 show that although all welfare changes are negative, the ranking 
of the demographic groups changes with the relative inequality aversion index. In addition, 
and, similar to the inequality measures, the ranking of the demographic groups changes with 
the choice of net income or money metric utility in the social welfare function. When only 
income is considered, single parents appear slightly worse off than single women after the 
policy change (except under lower relative inequality aversion values). However, when the 
value of leisure and home production time is taken into account, single parents have the 
lowest decrease in social welfare. The increase in leisure and home production time partly 
compensates for the reduced net income. 
  Two reasons can be given to explain why the relative reductions in social 
welfare are consistently higher when using net income. First, absolute net income changes are   22
on average higher than welfare changes (as shown in Table 4) because the latter take into 
account the increase in leisure and home production time. Second, initial social welfare values 
are lower when using net income. As a result, higher relative changes are obtained for net 
income based welfare measures than for money metric utility based welfare measures even if 
absolute changes were similar in size. 
4.3 Welfare Changes for Subgroups 
For different subgroups in the population, Table 7 examines the average welfare 
changes and compares these to the average net income changes for the first policy change. 
Those for whom EV = 0 are below the tax-free threshold and are not affected by the tax rate 
change. Since the comparisons are across households of different sizes, the welfare and 
income measures are equivalised using the Whiteford equivalence scale. The net income 
changes and the equivalent variations (or the compensating variations) are not necessarily the 
same even for individuals without a labour supply response. The existence of unchanged 
Marshallian labour supply does not necessarily imply the absence of an excess burden. 
Furthermore, an equivalent (or compensating) variation larger or smaller than the net income 
change in absolute terms may be found at another labour supply point than the observed 
labour supply point, even if utility is still optimal at the original observed labour supply. In 
addition, differences between the two measures in Table 7 could arise for individuals without 
labour response because individuals’ partners in couple households may have changed their 
labour supply. Nevertheless, the difference is clearly less for the group who did not change 
labour supply than for the groups who changed their labour supply. 
Couples are affected to the largest degree in terms of the proportion of households 
affected and in terms of the average decrease in net income and equivalent variation. This is 
due to the fact that couple households are on average at a higher income level than the other 
groups.  Percentage wise, single parents are the least affected but if they are affected their 
decrease in net income is relatively large. The difference between the net income change and 
equivalent variation is largest for single parents. This indicates that they have been more able 
than the other three groups to compensate for the loss in utility caused by the income loss by 
increasing leisure and home production time, which has translated in more substantial 
negative labour supply responses (see Table 5). 
As expected, those working full-time are more likely to be affected than the other 
groups and they have a larger decrease in net income and welfare if they are affected. The 
unemployed are least likely to be affected, followed by the non-participants including those   23
who are retired and/or have other sources of income than from labour supply. The average 
income changes for non-participants and unemployed, if they are affected, are similar, but the 
corresponding welfare losses are clearly lower for the unemployed than for non-participants.  
 
Table 7 The effect of an increase in tax with 5 percentage points for all positive tax rates 
EV > 0  EV = 0  TOTAL 
By income unit type 
% of IU 
Income change per 
adult equivalent 
($/year)




Income change per 
adult equivalent 
($/year) 
EV per adult 
equivalent 
($/year)
Couples 80.5  -1,671 1,409 19.5 -1,405  1,185
Single men  70.1  -1,585 1,387 29.9 -1,111  972
Single women  54.3  -1,367 1,183 45.7 -742  642
Single parents  47.1  -1,480 735 52.9 -666  331
By labour force status                
Full time  97.7  -1,872 1,558 2.3 -1,829  1,522
Non-participant 24.6  -676 660 75.4 -166  162
Part-time 85.8  -888 786 14.2 -762  675
Unemployed 13.6  -658 575 86.4 -89  78
By labour supply response                
Working more  100.0  -2,094 1,605 0.0 -2,094  1,605
No change  55.2  -1,156 1,145 44.8 -638  632
Working less  100.0  -1,980 1,790 0.0 -1,980  1,790
TOTAL 70.1  -1,627 1,356 29.9 -1,233  1,027
  
Similar patterns are observed when disaggregating by income unit type, labour force 
status and labour supply response for the other policy change. One result, from a 
disaggregation of the results for an alternative policy change of decreasing tax rates, is worth 
mentioning as it clearly illustrates the potential for different conclusions regarding the impact 
of policy changes depending on the measure being used. Consider a policy change in which 
all positive income tax rates are decreased by 5 percentage points, rather than the first policy 
above where they are increased. Similar outcomes of $656, $754 and $751 are observed for 
the net income change among those who were non-participants, part-time workers or 
unemployed respectively before the change. However, the equivalent variations are very 
different at -$293, -$503 and -$78 respectively. Based on net income changes, the conclusion 
would be that part-time workers and unemployed are equally affected, with the non-
participants not far behind. Taking into account the changes in labour supply, the unemployed 
and non-participants still gain but to a lesser extent than would be inferred from the net 
income changes.  
The reason for this clear difference between the two measures for the tax decrease is 
that a decrease in tax rates encourages non-workers to enter the labour market. This affects   24
the group of non-participants and unemployed individuals, who are likely to experience 
stronger positive labour supply responses than the part-time and full-time workers (some of 
whom may even decrease their labour supply). The increased labour supply reduces the non-
workers’ utility levels and thus their equivalent variations. An increase in tax has the opposite 
effect, making it less likely that non-participants and unemployed individuals, who were not 
working before the reform, enter the labour market after the reform. That is, when tax rates 
increase, these non-workers are unlikely to change their labour supply behaviour, resulting in 
a net income change and an equivalent variation which are much more similar. 
The above results show that different conclusions may be reached regarding the group 
affected to the largest degree by a policy change depending on whether net income changes or 
welfare changes are measured. The advantage of using welfare changes in the evaluation of 
policy changes is that it takes into account the value of leisure or home production time. A 
microsimulation model that allows for labour supply responses would therefore benefit from 
the inclusion of welfare measures in order to evaluate the value of an increase or decrease in 
leisure time to the households.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the calculation of compensating and equivalent variations in 
the context of labour supply modelling, where highly nonlinear budget constraints are 
common. In an earlier paper, it was shown that the standard method of computing welfare 
changes may not give appropriate values (Creedy and Kalb, 2005b). This arises if the 
computation involves hours levels for which the linearised virtual budget constraint indicates 
a different net income compared with the exact nonlinear budget constraint, or when corner 
solutions are involved. A method of calculating exact welfare changes, allowing for the full 
detail of the budget constraint, was discussed in the context of discrete hours models. Discrete 
hours models have gained importance because they are being more widely adopted as a result 
of their substantial advantages in preference estimation. 
The implementation of the method in the context of microsimulation, using 
econometrically estimated direct utility functions for particular demographic groups, was 
examined here. A method of producing (conditional) average welfare changes for each 
individual was proposed, based on the use of ‘calibration’ to ensure that, for all individuals, 
their optimal labour supply before a hypothetical tax change is equal to the observed 
(discretised) labour supply reported in the dataset. The special case of quadratic direct utility 
functions, which are widely used in labour supply modelling, was discussed and used in the   25
empirical example. 
To illustrate the use of the approach in microsimulation, two policy changes involving 
tax increases of different magnitudes were simulated. An advantage of using welfare change 
measures is that they can take into account the value of leisure or home production time. This 
advantage is of particular importance in policy evaluations which allow for labour supply 
responses. Therefore, measured differences between evaluations using welfare measures and 
those obtained using only changes in net incomes were examined. The results from the 
practical examples show that very different conclusions may be reached regarding individual 
comparisons, overall comparisons using social welfare functions and identification of those 
demographic groups affected to the largest degree by a policy change, depending on whether 
net income changes or welfare changes are measured. It was found that the marginal excess 
burden can take a wide range of values for individuals and subgroups in the population. 
Substantial marginal welfare costs associated with an increase in income tax rates were 
measured, in particular for single parents. 
Given the increasing use of behavioural microsimulation models in tax and social 
security policy evaluations, which are usually based on discrete choice labour supply models, 
the procedures outlined in this paper offer considerable scope for extending the range of 
analyses and measures generally used to judge the effects of proposed reforms. These new 
procedures allow the evaluation of any changes in leisure and home production time available 
to the income units in addition to the usual evaluation of changes in disposable income due to 
policy reforms.  26
The Appendix: Microsimulation Modelling 
We use MITTS, a microsimulation model, to calculate the effect of two alternative tax 
changes. The expected effects presented in this paper are based on estimated parameters for a 
structural labour supply model, which is described in more detail in Kalb (2002). That is, the 
labour supply effects are not actually observed but based on simulations. A more detailed 
general description of the behavioural microsimulation modelling approach used in this 
analysis can be found in Creedy and Kalb (2005a) and specific information on MITTS can be 
found in Creedy et al. (2002, 2004).  
The microsimulation is based on a sample of representative Australian households in 
the 2000/2001 SIHC. This is a survey of the Australian population at the time of the policy 
change of interest. Detailed information is available on each household and on the individuals 
in the households. This allows us to replicate the social security payments received and 
income tax paid for each individual and household according to the income tax and social 
security rules at any point in time or according to a hypothetical set of rules. Using the 
weights provided by the ABS, the sample can be weighted to obtain population amounts. 
A static simulation of the effects of a tax change involves the use of alternative budget 
constraints in the pre- and post-reform situation. The budget constraints incorporate all main 
tax and transfer programs ―in this paper, as they were in January 2001 (pre-reform) and in 
January 2001 including the hypothetical tax changes (post-reform)― and are computed using 
MITTS. Assuming unchanged labour supply, MITTS can calculate the net income of each 
individual before and after the change together with the social security payments which are 
received and income tax which is paid. From these individual amounts, aggregate expenditure 
and revenue can be computed using the ABS-provided weights to inflate sample totals into 
population totals. 
In the behavioural simulation, in which labour supply is allowed to change in response 
to a policy change, MITTS calculates net incomes for each household at all predetermined 
discrete labour supply points based on the wage rates of individuals (either observed in the 
data or imputed, using the estimated wage equations as described in Kalb and Scutella 
(2002)), other income, and some individual and household characteristics. As in the static 
simulation, the net incomes can be calculated imposing different tax and transfer systems, 
allowing hypothetical and real policy changes to be analysed. Together with the net incomes 
at all labour supply points, the estimated parameters from the structural labour supply model 
are key inputs in the behavioural component of the microsimulation model. They allow us to   27
simulate the labour supply responses of the policy change. The behavioural labour supply 
responses presented in this paper are based on a quadratic utility function with preference 
parameters which are allowed to vary with an individual’s characteristics. The approach 
follows the discrete choice approach taken by Van Soest (1995) and Blundell et al. (2000).
24  
The behavioural simulation begins by recording the discrete hours level for each 
individual that is closest to their observed hours level.
25 Then, given the parameter estimates 
of the utility function (which vary according to a range of demographic characteristics), a 
random draw is taken from the distribution of the ‘error’ term. This draw is rejected if it 
results in an optimal hours level that differs from the discretised value observed before the 
reform, otherwise the draw is accepted.
26 The accepted drawings are then used to determine 
the optimal hours level after the policy change. A total of 100 ‘successful draws’ (that is, 
drawings which generate the observed hours as the optimal value under the base system for 
the individual) are produced. Conditional on this set of random draws, a probability 
distribution over the set of discrete hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer 
structure
 is generated.
27 Thus the same error terms, representing the random utility component 
which is for example due to unobserved factors, are used before and after the reform. 
However, the tax and transfer system is changed in the reform, which changes net household 
incomes, and as a result changes the deterministic utility levels and potentially the optimal 
level of labour supply. The labour supply after the reform is calculated as the average 
outcome across all draws of the error terms.  
                                                 
24 As Blundell et al. note, the discrete choice labour supply model has become increasingly popular. Given the 
aim of simulating policy changes with regard to the tax and transfer system and assessing its effect on labour 
supply, a discrete model specification of labour supply choice is chosen to enable us to deal with the full detail of 
the tax and transfer system. In other regards, the model has been kept relatively simple; for example no explicit 
home production is included.  
25 Labour supply is kept constant for some groups who are expected to differ in their responses (that is, be less 
responsive) compared to the average working-age individual. These groups are the self-employed, those on 
disability payments, full-time students and people over 65 years of age.  
26 The optimal hours level is the labour supply where the utility of an individual is at a maximum. 
27 See Creedy and Kalb (2005a) for a detailed description of the estimation, specification and simulation in 
behavioural microsimulation modelling.   28
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